Ford v. *Ticknor,* 169 Mass. 276; *Collins* v. *Wickwire,* 162 Mass. 143; *Godshalk* v. *Akey,* 109 Mich. 350; *Evans* v. *Folk,* 135 Mo. 397; *Shapleigh* v. *Shapleigh,* 69 N. H. 577; *Hunt* v. *Smith,* 58 N. J. Eq. 25; *Wooster* v. *Cooper,* 53 N. J. Eq. 682; *Robinson* v. *Shotwell,* 55 N. J. Eq. 318; *In re Weeden's Est.,* 76 N. Y. S. 462; ROOD, WILLS, §§ 536, 544. When the estate to which the power is annexed is not strictly defined there is a rule which says that the power enlarges the estate to a fee. ROOD, WILLS, §§ 537, 543. But this rule is not without dispute. *Tyson's Est.,* 191 Pa. 218; ROOD, WILLS, § 547; *Mansfield* v *Shelton,* 67 Conn. 390. And where the estate given is a life estate by clear implication such estate is not enlarged by the power. ROOD, WILLS. § 543. The estate granted to the wife in the principal case, while not expressly given for life, may be construed as such by implication. Since a party having such a limited estate with a particular special power annexed, i. e. to sell for support, does not have an estate in fee, it seems that it should naturally follow that any sale made by such a party should be made expressly in pursuance of the power in order to bind the remaindermen. In other words the presumption should be that such a sale was not made for the purposes of the power, to be overcome only by an express declaration in the deed of sale that it was so made.

EASEMENTS—ADJOINING BUILDINGS—COMMON STAIRWAY—WAY OF NECESSITY.—G was the owner of lots 3 and 4. He erected a building on lot 4, and on the inside of the north wall, which was placed on the boundary line between the two lots, he built a stairway running to the second story. Some years afterwards he erected a building on lot 3, and in order to gain access to the second story thereof he so planned it as to use the stairway which had been erected on lot 4. The stairway was used continuously as a means of ingress and egress to the second stories of both buildings. G afterwards conveyed lot 3, and later conveyed lot 4 to another party. Held, that the grantee of lot 3 acquired an easement to the use of the stairway on lot 4; and that to maintain his right to such easement, he was not bound to show that it was a way of necessity. *Stephens* v. *Boyd,* (Iowa 1912), 138 N. W. 389.

For a discussion of the principals involved in this case see 11 MICH. L. REV. 252.

ELECTIONS—NUMBERING BALLOTS—CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTY OF SECRECY OF BALLOT.—The plaintiff instituted proceedings to set aside the result of an election relative to the sale of intoxicating liquors in the defendant city.. The basis for the proceeding was that the ballots had been numbered by the election officers in such a manner as to make it possible to ascertain how each person voted, and that such distinguishing mark made the election void, being contrary to the constitutional provision "that all elections shall be by secret ballot." *Held,* that the numbering of the ballots by the election officers acting under the honest belief that the same was proper, and without any intention of destroying the secrecy of the ballot, or of ascertaining how any elector voted, does not vitiate the election even though in violation of the secrecy guaranteed by the constitution. *Hardy* v. *City of Beaver,* (Utah 1912) 125 Pac. 679.